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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

NIELSON SCOTT COMPANY, INC.
AND DEMETRIOS AGATHANGELIDES,
DBA GREEK GARDENS,·
Defendants and Appellants,
Supreme Court No.
16136

NEILSON SCOTT COMPANY, IiK.,
Third-Party Plaintiff and
Third-Party Respondent,
vs.

DrnETRIOS AGATHANGELIDES,
Third-Party Defendant and
Third-Party Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Fourth District Court
The Honorable Allen B. Sorensen

GLEN
j ELLI s
359 West Center,
I

GORDON

J,

LOH

Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Respondent

175 East First North
Loga~, Utah 84321

GERALD L. TURNER

343 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PROVO CIiY CORPORATIOI(

)

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

!
l
-----l
NI ELSON SCOTT COMPANY INC.
AND DEMETR IOS AGATHANGELIDESJ
OBA GREEK GARDENS,
J.

Defendants and Appellants, )

NI ELSON SCOTT COMPANY

J

me'

J

Third-Party Plaintiff and
Third-Party Respondent,
vs.

DEMETRIOS AGATHANGELIDESJ
Third-Party Defendant and
Third-Party Appellant.

Supreme Court No.
16136

l
ll

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit for breach of contract by a
subcontractor for public improvements done for the
City under a general contract with Nielson Scott
Company, Inc. under which Demetrios Agathangelides,
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dba Greek Gardens, was the subcontractor.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON

APPEAL

The respondents request the Court to sustain th;
finding of the lower court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent Provo City contracted with
Nielson Scott Company, Inc., for the performance of
a major downtown redevelopment project on Center street
in Provo.

Nielson Scott in turn contracted with the

appellant herein, Greek Gardens, as a subcontractor
in charge of the tree planting and landscaping portion
of the redevelopment project.

The contract was awarded

on the 11th of September, 1974 and the appellant had
all of the trees provided for in the contract installed
by December 10, 1975.

An inspection of the trees on

May 5, 1976, disclosed that 12 of the trees had died
over the winter and the City through John Maas, the
architect who was in charge of the job, made demand
upon the appellant to replace the 12 trees.
The appellant agreed by letter (Exhibit No. 71
to replace the 12 trees but requested that replanting
be postponed until November of 1976 because of the
hazard to the trees in transplanting them when they
were not in a dorrnan t

state.

The architect 1 Maas'

approved the delay in replanting and noted in his
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testimony (see trial transcript pages 26, 27 and 31)
that in the fall of the year, trees are dormant and that
because of the risks of transportation in cold weather,
and other factors, the risk of loss continued still
upon the subcontractor until the following spring when
it was possible for the first time to determine whether
the trees were alive or dead.
It was stipulated during the trial that in
the spring of 1977, it was observed and without dispute
that all 12 of the trees that had been replanted the
first time had died over the winter.
The trial court granted judgment on the basis
that the responsibility to see that the trees were
alive continued until the next spring.

Until then,

it was not possible to determine whether the trees in
fact survived the winter dormant stage.

The lower

court made findings that the trees in fact did not ever
show life and rendered judgment on the basis of the
actual cost to the City of buying and installing replacement trees.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE SUBCONTRACTOR PROV ID ING TRE f.;S
R 8 PLANTING PRO ECT H A C0;1-

~i~~ I~§THe~~~HYA~~TA~PA~~Nt~~E~Lt6~

The original contract referred to in the trial
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as Exhibit No. 3 and particularly paragraph 31 (d} on
page 8, anticipates a warranty period of one year after
date of "substantial completion."

As the appellant

sets forth in his brief, it was found that 12 of t~
trees installed under the contract by the subcontractor
died during the first winter.
The contractor submitted to the City a written
request that instead of replacing those 12 trees in
May of 1976 when they were found to be dead that he
be allowed to defer the replanting until the next fall.
Consent was given and that consent amounted to a modification of the original contract, a novation of

t~

original contract terms, since substantial completion
had been accomplished in December of 1975.
The doctrine of modification of contract (see
12 Arn. Jur. Contracts §465 at page 934) recognizes that
a written contract may be modified with the assent of
both parties providing that the modification be susceptible of proof and that there be consideration
given.

Consideration in this case, as recited in the

original document (Exhibit 7) was the fact that the
·
t o th e delay i· n replanting would
City ' s acquiescence
be of benefit to the subcontractor in that the trees
would have a better chance of surviving if they were
planted in the fall rather than in the late spring.
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There was a reciprocal disadvantage, however,
in the fact that the City would not be able to tell
whether the trees actually came out of their dormant
stage until after the end of the warranty period.
It is implicit from the general reading of the
contract that the purpose of the warranty period was to
guarantee that the trees as planted would survive at
least one growing season.

John Maas, who was the

architect on the job, testified before the Court
(trial transcript pages 29 and 31) that the extension
of the time for planting the trees in the first replanting made it impossible to determine whether the second
replanting would actually survive the winter until
after the one-year warranty period had expired.

The

responsibility remained upon the subcontractor until
the next spring when it was discernible whether or not
the trees budded out and leafed sufficient to establish
that they were in fact growing and living trees.
Our legislature has addressed the dual subjects
of express warranties and implied warranty for merchantability in the Uniform Commercial Code, and particularly
in Sections 70A~2-313 and 70A-2-314, Utah Code Annotated
(1953), as amended.
Section 313 states:
70A-2-313.

Express warranties
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by affir~~tion, promise, description,
sample.--(1)
Express warranties by the
seller are created as follows:
(a)
Any affirmation of fact or promise
made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part
of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promise.
Section 314 provides:
.•• a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract
for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind.
It is the contention of the respondent that
Greek Gardens is subject to both the express warranty
for the one year period after substantial completion
and by modification of that contract for a sufficient
period of time to determine whether the substitute
plants were themselves viable.

The appellant, as

an acknowledged landscaping contractor and nurseryman,
is in fact a seller of goods of the kind which he contracted to provide for the City and is therefore, in
addition, liable on the implied warranty statute.
The interpretation of warranty statutes with
respect to sale of seed and nursery stock has been a
prolific source of litigation and compilations of the
many hundreds of cases on the subject are found in
16 A.L.R.
A.L.R.

859, 32 A.L.R. 1241, 62 A.L.R, 451, 11

470, 168 A.L.R.

7

581, 40 A.L.R.2d 273.

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah long
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ago determined that the existence or nonexistence of
either an implied or express warranty is a question of
fact and if so found by the finder of fact will not be
disturbed by the Supreme Court upon appeal.

See

Nielson v. Hermansen, 166 P.2d 536 and other cases
cited therein.
The criteria for what constitutes a warranty

in connection with a sale are set forth so succinctly
in the Nielson v. Hermansen case that it could well
have been the prototype upon which our present Uniform
Commercial Code definitions of warranty could have been
based.
The position taken by the appellant herein is
that he acknowledged the responsibility to make one
replacement of trees which breached the warranty but
he sees no obligation to go beyond that point.

The

point of law at issue is covered well by a series of
cases from California.

See Ackerman v. Levy and

Zentner, 45 P.2d 386 (1935); Southern California
Enterprises, Inc. v. Walter, 178 P.2d 785 (1947); and
Aced v, Hobbs, 360 P.2d 897.
The Ackerman case states that warranties as
to nursery stock and planting seed are "prospective"
--relating to the happening of a future event--and
are not broken until the happening of such event.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Southern California Enterprises case
involved a cause of action based upon a breach of
warranty with respect to an expensive carpet and was
held to state a cause of action on a warranty of a
future happening and that the Statute of Limitations
did not begin to run until the future event failed to
materialize.

The Court further held that the Statute

of Limitations was tolled as long as the manufacturer
attempted to repair the imperfections in the carpet by
the doing of remedial work by the seller.

See l Willis·

ton on Sales 2d, Ed. §212A page 411.
The final case cited, Aced v. Hobbs, was one
involving a copper tube heating system that was installe;
in a home.

The tubing was bedded in cement.

The warran:

was implied to continue past the time when a Statute of
Limitations would normally have barred an action for
unmerchantability.

The Statute was held to commence

at the time the latent defect was discovered.

As point·

ed out in 67 Am. Jur.2d Sales §474 at pages 646 and
64 7, an implied warranty against a latent defect is
imposed against either the manufacturer (or grower) or
a nonmanufacturing seller.

The real test is whether the

latent defect made the product unmerchantable and not
fit for the particular purpose for which i t was sold.
As to the scope of the warranties, see 67 Alli.
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Jur,2d Sales §506 at pages 684 and 685 where the term
"condition"

(the same term used in the contract between

the parties to this suit) as used in a warranty that
fruit trees are in a good condition is synonymous with
the term "quality" and refers to the living state and
capacity to grow, and to living trees and is broken by
furnishing trees without sufficient vitality to take
root and grow.

Quoting Wellington v. Frazier, 19 Ont.

L.88.
Interpreting the contract in the manner
suggested by appellant removed the risk of loss from
the subcontractor and unfairly places it upon the
purchaser of the trees and ignores the fact that the
thing contracted for by the City was not just so many
trees

stuck in the ground but in fact was for the

specified number of growing and viable trees which are
able to sustain themselves through a full growing season.

PO Ii'JT II
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT IS THE
COST TO THE OTHER PARTY
TO REMEDY THE BREACH.
The subject of damages with respect to a breach
of warranty for fitness varies with the nature of the
article being warranted.
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For instance, in the Southern California
Enterprises case, which dealt with carpet which was
unfit for use 1 the Court held that an allegation as to
the purchase price when coupled with the fact that
the article sold was unfit for use was sufficient to
state a cause of action and the damages could amount
to the cost actually paid by the buyer to the seller.
Since the original contract price between the
City and the appellants herein provided for payment of
$550.00 per tree, it was not unreasonable for the Court

to assess the lower figure of $330.00 that it did based
upon the evidence received.

The discussion of damages

in 168 A.L.R. page 591 quotes cases in which seed is
involved.

They hold that the measure of damages is the

difference between the value of the seed sold and the
value of the product that would have resulted had the
seed corresponded to the warranty; or that the damages
were those special damages resulting from the breach of
a warranty, which damages naturally resulted from the
breach.

There was no liability for remote or conjectural

consequences but that the recovery should be the natural
or proximate result of the defendant's alleged wrong·
doing
It appears, however, that the best rule is
.
Lavar
that stated by our Supreme Court in
t h e cas e of :-----Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Park v. Moorman Manufacturin~, 121 Utah 2d 339, 241
P.2d 914, which held that the fundamental principle of
damages is to restore the injured party to the position
he would have been in had it not been for the wrong of
the other party.

Based upon that rule, it would appear

that the logical assessment of damages would be the cost
to the City of redoing the work that the subcontractor
had refused to do after due notice,

The fact that he

possibly could have done it at less expense to himself

is waived when he refuses to perform and puts that duty
upon the City which has an interest in seeing that the
trees are planted uniformly and that their growth is
uniform in appearance which would not be the case had
the trees been deferred in their planting until after
all litigation was completed.

CONCLUSION
The trial court, as finder of fact, found
sufficient evidence that there had occurred a breach of
contract and that the express and implied warranties of
fitness went beyond the contract period of one year
from substantial completion, and in fact would continue
on until the trees were shown to be viable for one year
after planting.
The trial court likewise correctly assessed
damages at actual cost of remedying the breach and not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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upon some lesser figure for which appellant could have
provided the trees had he elected to do so.
Respecttully submitted this

/0

day of

March, 1979.

CERTIFICATE OF

n~ILING

Ten copies of the foregoing Respondent's
Brief were mailed to the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah, in care of the Clerk of the Supreme Court,
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110,

a~

two copies of the same were mailed to Gordon J. Low,
attorney for defendants and appellants, 175 East 1st
North Street, Logan, Utah 84321; and two copies were
mailed to Gerald L. Turner, attorney for defendants and
appellants, 343 South 400 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this

/2-

day of March, 1979, first class

postage prepaid.
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